The Problems of Applying Constitutional Majority in the Formation of the Executive Authority under Iraqi and Lebanese Law\\\\"

Abstract

Abstract: In conclusion, the study indicates that requiring a qualified majority or two-thirds majority for electing the president and granting confidence to the government leads to the paralysis of state institutions, particularly in proportional parliamentary systems with fragmented parliaments, as in Iraq and Lebanon. In Iraq, the Supreme Federal Court created the phenomenon of the \\\\\\\\"blocking third,\\\\\\\\" making the presidential election virtually impossible without the agreement of the major blocs. In Lebanon, parliamentary custom and the interpretations of the Speaker of Parliament have made a two-thirds quorum a requirement for every round of voting, turning boycotts into a permanent strategy for postponing the election, while simultaneously undermining the original constitutional provision that allows for an absolute majority after the first round. The direct consequence of this situation is the weakening of the executive branch\\\\\\\\'s legitimacy, as the president becomes a figurehead and the prime minister is forced to appease the blocs to secure a vote of confidence, leading to ministerial power-sharing and poor government performance. Furthermore, prolonged political deadlock paralyzes budgets and legislation, reducing the government to a caretaker administration with limited powers. Furthermore, the qualified majority and the blocking third grant minorities obstructionist power, fostering a culture of forced compromise and making external pressures more influential on local authorities. To address these problems, the study recommends gradually reducing the majority threshold in cases of failure, defining the largest bloc constitutionally, and clarifying the role of the judiciary in resolving electoral disputes. It also proposes adopting a presumed confidence in the government to ensure state continuity, strengthening the popular legitimacy of the executive branch, and establishing clear mechanisms to break political deadlocks and guarantee the uninterrupted functioning of state institutions.